Cambodia: July 1. Shock and Aftermath. What happened in Cambodia on July 5- 6, 1. Thomas Hammarberg, the United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia, made it clear in his October 1. UN General Assembly: the events of July 5- 6 were a . Through interviews at the time and in the years since with senior CPP and FUNCINPEC officials, senior military officials of the CPP, FUNCINPEC and KPNLF, diplomats, foreign military attaches, human rights workers, and residents of Phnom Penh who witnessed the fighting, the basic facts are clear. Other senior CPP figures, including party president Chea Sim, Interior Minister Sar Kheng, Defense Minister Tea Banh, and head of the armed forces Ke Kim Yan, argued against military action and refused to mobilize their forces, causing deep strains in the party. 1 User Rating; 2 Profile; 3 Movies. After the coup, many senior CPP officials who refused to participate sandbagged their homes and put their guards on full alert, fearful that Hun Sen would then strike against them for their disloyalty. On July 5- 6 his ad hoc forces, led by loyalists including Kun Kim, Mol Roeup, Sao Sokha, Hok Lundy, and Keo Pong, defeated the FUNCINPEC forces who had not been disarmed in the previous week. He then unleashed his forces to carry out a campaign of extrajudicial executions, primarily of FUNCINPEC military officers. One unit in particular, the . The government has never opened an investigation or made efforts to prosecute Pheakedey or any other perpetrators. Instead of being prosecuted, Pheakadey is now a General. Donors and diplomats who say they are committed to the fight against impunity have simply dropped the issue. Many trace it back to the flawed power sharing formula after FUNCINPEC won the UNTAC- organized elections in May 1. The CPP insisted on an equal share of power and refused to relinquish control of the security services. The international community and then Prince Norodom Sihanouk imposed a coalition with Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen as co- Prime Ministers. The CPP's successful threat to use force if its conditions were not met may have emboldened Hun Sen to use military force if his hold on power was ever threatened again. Laura Lippman, Stop, You're Killing Me! Toutes les listes qui int The Anthony Awards are literary awards for mystery writers presented at the. Release Date: 1997 Runtime: 90 min Genre: Action Killing Me Hardly at the Internet Movie Database. Chinese Media-Stars - Chinese Movie List - Chinese Movie Awards. This coup attempt was led by former Minister of Interior Sin Song and national police chief Sin Sen, both of whom were furious at Hun Sen for being left out of the coalition government. The coup attempt was backed by Thaksin Shinawatra's IBC TV, after his television contract was ripped up by the co- Prime Ministers. Ironically, Hun Sen was saved in part by Ranariddh and FUNINCPEC forces under General Nhek Bun Chhay, who sent their forces to confront rebel CPP tanks motoring in from their stronghold in Prey Veng. The price Hun Sen exacted from the CPP coup plotters and their patrons was greater control of the armed forces. He appointed his own man, Hok Lundy, as national police chief. Until then internal security had been Chea Sim's domain. Hok Lundy reported directly to Hun Sen despite the fact that his formal boss was Sar Kheng - a close confidante of Chea Sim and an internal party opponent of Hun Sen. Perhaps even more important, Hun Sen decided to build up his personal . All of this soon made Hun Sen the strongest physical force in the CPP. Hok Lundy and the bodyguard unit played key roles in the July 1. The CPP had reneged on a promise to appoint FUNCINPEC members to half the district chief positions in the country, a key part of the 1. There was deep dissatisfaction in FUNCINPEC over the lack of real power sharing (and the opportunities for corruption that came with it) and the party's clearly second- class status in the government. Ranariddh had shown himself to be a weak and incompetent leader. His party was losing public esteem as it failed to implement any of its 1. Ranariddh decided that FUNCINPEC should attempt to reach military parity with the CPP. It was a ridiculous idea to compete with Hun Sen and the CPP in military terms, . His intentions were discerned as early as April 1. UN political representative in Cambodia, Benny Widyono. Widyono warned in a cable to UN headquarters that Hun Sen was contemplating getting rid of Ranariddh. After meeting Hun Sen, Widyono concluded that Hun Sen was mapping out his . A further report from Widyono's office stated that at a secret April 3. CPP leaders, Hun Sen proposed taking military action against the FUNCINPEC . General Pol Sarouen, Kandal deputy governor Kun Kim and Phnom Penh deputy governor Chea Sophara were reported to support Hun Sen. In June 1. 99. 6 Chea Sim felt it necessary to publicly air his concerns, stating that there should be no confrontation between CPP and FUNCINPEC. About the only thing the two parties had in common was a rapacious appetite for wealth gained through high- level corruption. Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy, head of the opposition Khmer Nation Party (KNP), now agreed to work together to defeat the CPP in the 1. It was chaired by co- Ministers of Interior Sar Kheng and You Hokry (FUNCINPEC) and included Ke Kim Yan and Nhek Bun Chhay. None of these people had the power to block Hun Sen when he decided to use military force. At the same time, CPP officials say that Hun Sen was deeply concerned that the more moderate Sar Kheng was being promoted through the . There were frequent press reports about deep splits in the CPP between the Hun Sen and Chea Sim- Sar Kheng factions, with many in the party wanting to replace Hun Sen with someone they considered more palatable to voters. Minister of Justice Chem Snguon confirmed this to me, saying that Hun Sen had asked him to arrest Rainsy. According to Snguon, no fan of Rainsy, ? I didn't have any grounds.'. Hun Sen reacted by ordering Rainsy's arrest. The demand was so outrageous - Rainsy was nearly killed in the attack - that the order was ignored. This was not difficult, as many FUNCINPEC MPs were deeply disaffected from Ranariddh. At one point Hun Sen claimed 2. FUNCINPEC . But after leaving Hun Sen's home at Tuol Kraisang many of the MPs recanted, some going into hiding. The attempt to remove Ranariddh through . On April 2. 8, 1. Hun Sen announced that he had nothing to gain from a coup as he already held full power legitimately, but warned, . By May 1. 5, the investigation had implicated Hun Sen's bodyguard unit, not least because it allowed the grenade throwers through its lines to escape before turning its guns to stop those giving chase. Investigations showed that Hok Lundy's police, who normally were deployed at demonstrations, were ordered to stand down that morning. The lead FBI agent told the Cambodian police that things looked . The CPP- controlled military court opened a case against Ranariddh. Hun Sen accused Ranariddh of trying to import weapons illegally and destabilizing the government. It is unclear if this shipment was legal, but what is certain is that the CPP, like FUNCINPEC, was regularly importing arms and weapons without informing the other side. Both were also attempting to strike a deal with remaining Khmer Rouge forces in the north of the country (Ieng Sary and other Khmer Rouge forces in western Pailin and Malai areas had defected to Hun Sen, who outbid Ranariddh, in August 1. Hun Sen accused FUNCINPEC of bringing Khmer Rouge soldiers from Khmer Rouge headquarters in Anlong Veng into Phnom Penh, giving massive air time to a former Khmer Rouge fighter named Phon Pheap, who alleged Nhek Bun Chhay was hiding large numbers of Khmer Rouge at the FUNCINPEC base near the airport at Tang Kraisang. Ranariddh fed these claims by engaging in ham- fisted and desperate negotiations with Khieu Samphan to defect and bring his forces, Ieng Sary- style, to the FUNCINPEC side. We found only a few who may have been Khmer Rouge, but most were farmers from Prey Veng or Svay Rieng who had been offered money to come to Phnom Penh for work. This is not to say there were none. In May 1. 99. 7 I saw two Khmer Rouge soldiers guarding a safe house for FUNCINPEC . They had the look of jungle fighters and said they were from Malai. There were other anecdotal reports of Khmer Rouge forces coming to join FUNCINPEC. However, no credible evidence of the presence of significant numbers of Khmer Rouge members from Anlong Veng has ever been produced. French, Australian and Singaporean military attaches told me the claims were unfounded. On the other hand, as many as 3. Khmer Rouge fighters fought in the coup on Hun Sen's side under the command of Khmer Rouge defector Keo Pong. Two FUNCINPEC troops were killed. The tension in Phnom Penh was intense, with many expecting armed conflict to break out at any time. However, many others believed that Hun Sen would be blocked by others in his own party. These optimists, including many diplomats and some in FUNCINPEC, were wrong. Those present at the meeting say that this was strongly opposed by Ke Kim Yan, Tea Banh, Chea Sim and Sar Kheng. They argued that FUNCINPEC was not a military threat and that while it might have been bringing some Khmer Rouge into Phnom Penh, the number was not significant. They argued that the country had made too much progress since the Paris Peace Agreements to put it all at risk, and that they would be blamed by the international community and Cambodians if they used force to solve political problems. He demanded that members of the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh surrender to his forces or face tough action. On the same day, CPP General Pol Sareoun told a foreign historian that unless Ranariddh was arrested, there was soon going to be a . That same day, the Washington Post quoted an FBI report alleging that Hun Sen's bodyguards were involved in the March 3. One western military attach. On July 2, CPP forces seized FUNCINPEC's Prek Ta Ten base along route 5 north of Phnom Penh, killing one FUNCINPEC soldier and wounding three. His bodyguards drove to Phnom Penh. Along the way, pro- Hun Sen troops stopped them and gave them the choice of being shot or disarmed.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. Archives
January 2017
Categories |